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Abstract 
 
Marx’s concept of fetishism expresses a market ideology of capitalist society representing the social world as 
commodities being exchanged according to immutable laws of the market and being quantifiably produced by 
machinery. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century bourgeois economists articulated this market ideology in different 
forms. Two antinomic tropes are the sensationalist trope, dating from pre-modern times, defining the discursive codes 
of luxury and technological inventions displayed in the consumer markets; and the trope of monotony, expressing the 
qualities of industrial production regarding the repetition of unpleasant but necessary work and the regularity of 
machinery. In the eighteenth century, the trope of sensationalism pertained exclusively to luxury goods traded by 
merchant capital. In the nineteenth century, the sensationalist trope was intimately tied to commodity and capital 
fetishism when industrial capital represented itself in the consumerist sphere of merchant capital providing innovative 
commodities to the popular strata of society. At the same time, political economists grappled with the economic 
significance of industrial production as they produced the trope of monotonous machinery and industrial work that 
expressed the ideological essence of commodity and capital fetishism. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From the start of the nineteenth century, the modern capitalist mode of production gradually subsumed 
labour and its social world under the spell of commodity exchange relations. From a Marxist perspective, 
this universalizing tendency of commodification went hand in hand with commodity fetishism, the 
ideological transformation of social relations into inverted commodity relations. Commodity fetishism 
reifies labour in two ways. First, it socializes labouring subjects as agents of market exchange. Although 
value can be generated only by the productive capacity of labour, this capacity becomes commodified and 
exchanged as labour power. Thus, the relations of exchange are reflected into the raison d’être of the 
capitalist production process.1  
Within this capitalist setting, the workers can solely sustain their physical life processes through selling 
their labour power and buying the commodities thus produced. These two exchange relations determine 
their capacity to labour — the capitalist mode of production thus structurally transforms all historical life 
processes. Commodity fetishism not only entails an ideological mirage representing the material world 
produced by labour as an endless circulation of commodities, but in fact is the post festum result of the value 
inscribed in the commodity. Commodity fetishism is a semblance of what actually constitutes value, but it 
is also the direct appearance of capitalist social relations intervening in the subjectivity of all members of 
                                                 
1 Christopher J. Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 44. 
History of Intellectual Culture, 2014-16 
 
2 
society — workers, capitalists, and intellectuals.2 The ever-present immediacy of the circulation of 
commodities presents the acts of exchange in a naturalist-realist garb, but, at the same time, is the primary 
force shaping the alienated subjectivity of the worker.3 Second, the capitalist production of value in 
particular cannot emerge without commodity fetishism permeating all facets of historical life processes. 
Commodity fetishism inseparably exists in production by the workings of the materialized ideological 
practices of exchange. It is indispensable as a real social force in constructing the capitalist mode of 
production.  
In production, capital grounds alienated labour as the essence of production if commodity fetishism is 
already posited as the appearance of exchange-value. At the same time, fetishism becomes a general feature 
of all value-forms and determinate forms of distribution: 
 
The fetish character is not linked to the nature of the mode of production which is 
at the origin of the commodity but arises as soon as, in commodity society, the 
individual’s labour, whatever its form, exchanges itself through the exchange of 
the labour product as commodity, in such a way that social labour takes the form 
of a thing distinct from individuals’ activity. The relationship between individuals, 
which is nothing else than the relationship between their mutual activities, 
presents itself in the value as the quality of a thing. Therefore if on the one hand 
fetishism of money is just a developed form of commodity fetishism, on the other 
hand fetishism transforms itself with the development of capitalist production, 
into the fetishism of capital, a product of labour that appears to be an autonomous 
power dominating the worker.4 
 
The entire gamut of value-forms reifies the ensemble of social relations through the prism of fetishism.5 
From this fetishistic perspective, historical agents always had to abide by the immutable force of the market 
as the optimum allocation of scarce commodities. Individuals simply reiterate what has been a priori posited 
as rational and efficient behaviour. The fetishistic exchange model, with its circular flow of commodities, 
acknowledges neither stratification nor the qualitative differences between what has been commodified. In 
order to achieve this abstraction of capitalism as a pure market exchange mechanism — ungrounded due 
to a complete split between antagonistic forms of economic domination and rendering the forms of abstract 
thought non-contradictory — the money form presented as solely a simple means of exchange and the 
commodity form as an object of want coincide. While in reality, money as social power is integral to 
property relations of the means of production, the fetishistic model considers it as merely a semblance of 
commodity exchange to come. The “want” problem is reduced to a matter of individuals responding to the 
scarcity of money/objects instead of problematizing the nexus of production, exchange, and money.6 The 
capitalist mode of production, being presented as compounded exchange, provides life’s necessities.  
Commodity fetishism is the articulated ideology of the market representing modern economic 
practices. On the one hand, fetishism is related to subjects exclusively relying on exchange relations for the 
material reproduction of their livelihood. Ubiquitous exchange relations are necessary for the ideology of 
commodity fetishism to firmly root itself in the collective social consciousness in which “the purely social 
                                                 
2 Dieter Wolf, Kritische Theorie und Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Berliner Verein zur Förderung der MEGA-
Edition, 2004), 101. 
3 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), 168. 
4 Laurent Baronian, Marx and Living Labour (London: Routledge, 2013), 37. 
5 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (London: Penguin, 1992), 969. 
6 Duncan Foley, “Marx’s Theory of Money in Historical Perspective,” in Marx’s Theory of Money: Modern Appraisals, ed. 
Fred Moseley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 44.  
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power of the exchangeability of the commodity [seems to be] a natural property of the product of labor.”7 
On the other hand, the concept of fetishism pertains to all facets of practical life under capitalism: the 
endless consumption of final consumer objects, labour producing these objects, and machinery augmenting 
productivity.  
Fetishism is intimately related to the fragmented sense of social life in capitalism. All these practices 
stated above are ideologically conceived as formal relations between individuals and objects. Marx clarified 
the fetish-like character (Fetischcharakter) of social life as a “real inversion of human social powers as 
attributes of things.”8 The fetish-like character of machinery is perhaps the ultimate vanishing point of 
human social power because subjects under capitalism must obey the “objective” patterns and rhythms of 
the machine. As a consequence, people immediately perceive their social world only as the continuous 
circulation of commodities. Fetishism fragmentizes their social consciousness about the interrelatedness of 
human practices.  
 
Fetishism and the Sensationalist Trope 
 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economic treatises can be considered as materialized cultural artefacts 
of the ideology of fetishism. These artefacts are specific fragments of capitalist modernity precisely because 
commodity fetishism had yet to dominate society. In the nineteenth century, bourgeois economists were 
still searching for a coherent synoptic model of the commodification of society. They emphasized that they 
were living in a temporal continuum between the pre-modern and the modern defined by a linear 
progression of expanding market access to commodities while they also considered fixed capital — the 
economic term for standardized machinery — as what gave birth to an epochal break with a romanticized 
pastoral past.  
The relation between the emerging history of this fragmentary view of modernity, shattered artefacts, 
and the temporal process of commodification was already explored by Walter Benjamin: 
 
The exposition of the mythic forms of modernity was to have as its focus the 
critical analysis of the commodity and its fetishization under the conditions of 
modern consumer capitalism. The commodity contains within it all the tendencies 
of nineteenth-century Parisian social life. For Benjamin it was the fragment that 
held the key to, and disclosed the totality of modern cultural forms. The 
commodity constitutes the monadological form for the prehistory of modernity.9 
 
Benjamin’s unfinished Passagenwerk exposes the everyday religion of the fetishized commodity form by 
analysing the emergence of the Parisian consumer culture in the material form of the arcades (precursor of 
the twentieth-century department store). In these arcades, the natural form of the commodities, the 
immediate use-value of the physical body of the commodity, becomes a vessel of symbolic-material signs 
of exchange coded and recoded in the social world. Although industry positioned the economic centrality 
of capital–labour relations, this early modern world struggled with its own multi-temporal experience of 
capitalism as a cultural complex. Society did not define itself exclusively as a production-centred society; 
it still fundamentally required tropes from the past to articulate the fetishism of the present. This non-
contemporaneity of the present manifested in the fetishistic appearance of the commodity, because: 
                                                 
7 Guido Starosta, “The Role and Place of ‘Commodity Fetishism’ in Marx’s Systematic-Dialectical Exposition in Capital,” 
Historical Materialism 25, no.3 (2017): 102. 
8 Ibid, 103. 
9 Graeme Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis: Walter Benjamin and the City (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 118. 
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To the form of the new means of production, which to begin with is still dominated 
by the old . . . there correspond images in the collective consciousness in which the 
new and the old are intermingled. These images are ideals, and in them the 
collective seeks not only to transfigure, but also to transcend, the immaturity of 
the social product and the deficiencies of the social order of production.10 
 
The arcade shops were deeply indebted to the pre-modern sensationalist trope of luxury goods — 
mystical, exotic, or otherworldly commercial manifestations of commodity — in order to sell what has been 
produced by hidden industrial means. Alberto Gabriele gives a clear definition of the sensationalist trope 
of commodity fetishism. The semantic field of eighteenth-century trope refers to “a theorization of moral 
sentiment . . . linking it to the cultivation of refinement enabled by commercial culture.” In the nineteenth 
century, however, sensationalism was related to “the empirical registering of impressions caught by a 
moving observer in modern capitalism . . . a relation between the observer and the spectacle observed . . . 
the sensational pertains to the immediate experience of perceiving reality in fragments . . . in which the 
spectacular qualities of the commodity plays a pivotal role.”11 John Jervis completes the definition of 
sensationalism by emphasizing its relevance to “a state of signification in which much of society becomes 
a theatre for the fictions it has created for its commodities . . . objects come to life as commodities through 
the spectacle, a vivid emplacement of our experience of the world as a world of commodities . . . 
commodities that variously entice, seduce or repel us in all their multiplicity.”12 
The multi-temporal process of fetishism and its sensationalist trope did not occur only in consumerist 
commodity exchange. In the second half of the nineteenth century in Britain, when the forces of production 
evolved into complex industrial urban hubs, capital fetishism equally came to the fore as the ideological 
focal point of unfettered capital accumulation. It marked a qualitative break in material conditions for the 
reproduction of social use-values. Fixed industrial capital flooded the world market with commodities in 
which use-value was subsumed to exchange-value. For Victorian economists — John Stuart Mill, Alfred 
Marshall, and Henry Sidgwick — their capitalist ideological image of the propensity to exchange objects of 
want anticipated the industrial capacity to mass-produce commodities that would facilitate market access 
for all workers. They viewed the circulation of exchange-value as a pre-modern habit that gave birth to 
industrial fixed capital. Production by fixed capital means completed optimal exchange processes.13  
For nineteenth-century French economists — Joseph Garnier, Charles Dunoyer, and Charles Coquelin 
— the early fetishization of commodity exchange resulted from the “innate” artisan’s ability to transform 
natural materials into high-quality commodities — the image of the humble and apolitical individual 
artisan fetishistically denying social agency of an army of disenfranchised workers. The cumulative 
traditions of skill and diligence led to a market determined by bourgeois taste.14 In both France and Britain, 
when these early economists traced the origin of the commodity, they confirmed Benjamin’s thesis of 
commodity fetishism as a link between the pre-modern and the modern.  
The language of commodity fetishism pervaded the emerging industrial system, one which was still 
partially dependent on artisanal skills and conventions. The question is whether the nineteenth-century 
economists, in their approval of the industrial system, were reiterating certain perceptions and discourses 
                                                 
10 Walter Benjamin, “Paris, Capital of the 19th Century,” New Left Review I/48 (1935, tr. 1968): 79. 
11 Alberto Gabriele, “Introduction,” in Sensationalism and the Genealogy of Modernity, ed. Alberto Gabriele (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 5–8. 
12 John Jervis, Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World (London: Bloomsbury, 2015): 136. 
13 Richard Biernacki, The Fabrication of Labor: Germany and Britain, 1640–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995), 299–312. 
14 E.g., Whitney Walton, France at the Crystal Palace: Bourgeois Taste and Artisan Manufacture in the Nineteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1992), 39–40. 
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reminiscent of the moral topics of their eighteenth-century forbearers, and did they continue to exalt the 
marvel of the invention of machines and luxury products? Was their nineteenth-century world thoroughly 
converted to the ideological image of fetishism, or did it still contain a moral substance of times past?  
Alberto Gabriele’s book Reading Popular Culture in Victorian Print brought forth the first Benjaminian 
analysis of Victorian consumer fetishism as a multi-temporal discourse in which the sensationalist trope 
played a pivotal role. Gabriele expounded on the appearance of the “sensational” in Victorian novels, 
advertisements, and periodicals. For Gabriele, the sensational was expressed through literary forms and 
generated by the presentation and representation of consumer commodities in warehouse departments or 
by early marketing methods. The sensationalist trope buttresses the ideological effectuality of commodity 
fetishism in the sphere of exchange. Sensationalist statements are located between the aesthetic semblance 
of the commodity and popular narratives about modern industrialist culture.  
Shaped by the mystical force of fetishism, this trope pervades several cultural fields of consumption: 
from the aesthetic forms of displaying new-fangled commodities signifying novelty and prestige through 
popular scientific allegories hallowing the industrial engineer as a metaphysical member of a priestly caste, 
to the shocking and otherworldly effects of technological innovation depicted in popular fiction. With this 
trope, Gabriele has actuated these artefacts as lived fragments propelling the emergence of commodity 
fetishism in the sphere of exchange: 
 
Modernity here represents the changes that affected the redrawing of the maps of 
the culture of industrialization, as seen here in new advertising strategies and in 
new patterns of consumption of products and ideas . . . with the techniques of a 
newly structured mass culture. . . . The sensational accumulation of sensorial 
stimuli contradicts the aesthetic assumptions that privileged a contemplative 
[work of art] . . . these amusements . . . partake of the periodic nature of 
performance, of the multiplication of ephemeral entertainment, of the prevalent 
sensation of passing impressions they stir in the public . . . riveting rhetorical 
strategies . . . constructing a fictional, sensationalized lure associated to industrial 
production.15 
 
For Gabriele, the sensational trope was intimately tied to the nineteenth-century market ideology of 
commodity fetishism. To sell commodities well, exchange agents conjured up a fictitious world of 
consumption in which a commodity was placed. The sensationalist trope was entangled and coded with 
the direct material properties of the use-value to establish the exchange circuit. This was particularly the 
case for the first forms of modern advertising.  
Nonetheless, the sensationalist trope of fetishism could not simply be traced to one singular point of 
origin. In displaying industrial commodities as otherworldly luxurious objects, it continuously referred to 
a pre-modern past, veiling its actual birthplace — the monotony of capitalist production. In short, the 
sensationalist trope had been revived from pre-modern times to carve out a consumer space separate from 
the actual “dirty secrets” of the production processes. The pre-modern sensationalist trope had been 
transposed onto the nineteenth century, and created fascination for modern physical appearances of the 
commodity and the inventions giving birth to it.  
As the study of nineteenth-century economic treatises shows, the transposition of the consumerist 
trope of sensationalism onto the industrialist repertoires of the political economy did not happen. The 
political economists were impressed by the endless series of inventions but they naturalized the 
                                                 
15 Alberto Gabriele, Reading Popular Culture in Victorian Print : Belgravia and Sensationalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 3–82. 
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commodity’s aesthetic qualities as simply differing consumer tastes satisfying the natural wants of a certain 
social group. The sensationalist trope did not greatly matter to them. They were interested in the apparently 
self-moving circularity of exchange — commodity fetishism — made possible by fixed capital. For these 
economists, as Marx had pointed out, commodity fetishism was the “natural” consequence of capital 
fetishism.16 Commodity fetishism had been reflected onto production as a self-propelling and monotonous 
machine always producing the necessary quantity for the current demand.17 These political economists did 
not discursively apply the sensationalist trope coded in the ideology of commodity fetishism onto their 
naturalization of the capitalist relations of production, that is, capital fetishism. The sensationalist trope 
was the domain of exchanging consumers while the knowledgeable sought to discover the laws of 
monotonous production and thereby proclaim their ideology of capital fetishism. 
In the previous century, Adam Smith had evinced a completely different sentiment about the exchange 
of luxury commodities. He was not enthralled by the monotonous machine — although considering a 
simple division of labour as both a curse and a blessing for the nation — simply because it did not yet exist. 
Luxury goods belonged to an exclusive domain of exchange consisting of an upper stratum of merchants 
and their aristocratic peers. Smith, contrary to the Victorians, did engage with the sensationalist trope as 
he simultaneously extolled and condemned luxury goods. For Smith, the physical aesthetic qualities of 
luxury goods and the emotions they aroused were topics worthy to be scientifically examined. He assessed 
the social, political, and moral ramifications of luxury markets in terms of sentiments and virtues: arousal, 
wonder, admiration, self-interest, and self-love, as examples. Smith argued that mercantile capital 
providing these luxury goods caused great moral disturbances in the minds of the people.18  
The sensationalist trope was at the heart of Smith’s appraisal of the commodity. This is surprising 
because as we shall see, nineteenth-century economists convinced themselves that they were simply 
picking up where Smith had ended. And, furthermore, these economists simply presumed that Smith had 
already developed a theory of market access — the commodity fetishistic concept of conceiving workers as 
participants of exchange in order to satisfy their wants — allowing them to see a mistaken continuity 
between Smith’s pre-modern market and their capitalist society. 
 
Pre-modern Economic Philosophy, Luxury, and Social Codes 
 
In the medieval centuries, community life and theologians condemned the dissipation and avarice of 
mercantile capital. For the Dominican cleric Thomas Aquinas, chrematistic conduct confused honourable 
trading skills with the promotion of commercial activities solely for the sake of money. Following an 
Aristotelian ethical viewpoint, avaritia (avarice) negatively interfered with the idea of proportionality 
between subjects because it sustains the idea of unlimited immoderation. Its opposite term in this context, 
temperantia (moderation in terms of self-control), refers to the Christian ideal of subordination of all desires 
to God’s virtuous commandments.19 Money, exchange-value, and use-value solely have temporal qualities: 
they are res temporarii (things determined by finite time). They exist as expressions of the moderate, finite, 
and honest necessities of daily life (the Aristotelian notion of ktèsis mesè, acquiring the amount of goods 
being morally acceptable as average and common) regulating proportionate exchange of goods. As the 
                                                 
16 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 268. 
17 The economist Heinz Kurz considered this as a central opinion being entertained by, for example, the greatest 
Victorian, John Stuart Mill. See Heinz D. Kurz, “Accumulation, Effective Demand and Income Distribution,” in Beyond 
the Steady State: A Revival of Growth Theory, eds. Joseph Halevi, David Laibman, and Edward J. Nell (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 77. 
18 Michael Perelman, Classical Political Economy: Primitive Accumulation and the Social Division of Labor (London: Rowman 
& Allanheld, 1984), 134. 
19 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981), Prima Pars, Quaestio 63, 2. 
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common good, seen as God sanctioning the honest community, possessed the infinite quality as the overall 
guiding moral principle of economic actions, it also entailed the ethical claim to obtain goods that satisfy 
human needs within moderate boundaries. Thus, the idea of the common good regulated the exchange of 
use-values in physical amounts of money. The chrematistic personality denied the finitude of the physical 
amount of money (terminum nescit sed in infinitum tendit, money knows no limit but tends to be infinite) as 
they ignores God as the one true infinity.20 
Aquinas’ articulation of his reinvented Aristotelian virtue ethics, the organic and systematized codes 
of his community, and the reformulation of the pre-modern value categories show that his philosophical 
writings simply did not give any indication that a fetishistic worldview could (in material terms) exist 
socially.21 Merchants could provide individuals luxuries for overindulgence, all of whom Aquinas takes to 
be transgressing the Christian virtues. Further, merchants often thought that money could replace the 
natural and rational boundaries of scarcity and balance created by God. But Aquinas had never entertained 
the idea that sufficient commodities were available to supersede the material finitude of the community as 
a whole. God’s rules explained why Aquinas’ world was defined by the limitations of pre-modern 
production. 
Aquinas’ tracts reflected the reciprocal expectations that existed between nobles, merchants, and 
masses as to how social distinctions could be normatively symbolized and encoded into the material culture 
of acquired luxury. The social coding of luxury commodities in medieval times illustrates the profound rift 
between the pre-modern and the modern. In late medieval times, these goods possessed symbolism whose 
process of signification — the creation of chains of signifiers construing the symbolic signs — had not been 
separated from the physical world. For the medieval subject, the aesthetic and ethical qualities were unified 
in different social and metaphysical spheres, and, in fact, reflected these spheres.22 The body, adorning itself 
with richness and beauty, cannot be separated from the exterior objects of representation.23 They reflected 
both the circles of kinship and family, communities, and towns, and the body politic under a sovereign. 
The perpetuation of the proper order of the spheres was tantamount to the will and authority of God. This 
implied that body, status, objects, and spheres belonged to a single unity, and that the sensational was 
meant to evoke this unity; a person’s rank, sanctioned by God’s plan of earthly dispensation, predetermines 
their value in monetary and commodity terms.24 Municipal authorities were bent on issuing regulations 
“dealing with the permitted number of pearls and rings, embroidery and fur linings, and the plunge of a 
neckline.”25  
Public authorities considered judicially coding the moral consequences of the exchange of luxury goods 
as their moral duty. This was still the case in the seventeenth century. The directives of the provincial High 
Court of the Pays du Grand Clermont in 1633, for example, clearly show that even higher officials were aware 
that the members of the merchant class were not generally regarded as virtuous. This court condemned the 
merchants of the city of Riom as a self-absorbed caste putting their own monetary advantages above all, 
and the free exchange of luxury goods was regarded as morally detrimental to the city’s civic order. 
Merchants flaunted their wealth by frivolously journeying in the countryside with their embellished 
                                                 
20 Ibid., Secunda Secundae, Quaestio 77, 4. 
21 Eugen Leitherer, Geschichte der Handels — und Absatzwirtschaftlichen Literatur (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961), 16–
19. 
22 Mary Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 89. 
23 Philip A. Mellor and Chris Shilling, Re-forming the Body: Religion, Community and Modernity (London: Sage, 1997), 41. 
24 Marc Shell, Money, Language, and Thought: Literary and Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modern Times 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), 65. 
25 Wim Blockmans, “The Feeling of Being Oneself,” In Showing Status: Representation of Social Positions in the Late Middle 
Ages, eds. Wim Blockmans and Antheum Janse (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, 1999), 2. 
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carriages, and thereby infuriating the local aristocratic order. The judges blamed the merchants for the 
epidemic spread of the excessive love for luxuries.26  
The legal expert and close associate of the head of the Parisian Parliament, Charles de la Rue, wrote in 
1647 that the perverted hydra of avarice and unbounded desire for power and money were the two most 
despicable causes of violent and criminal passions. Usury, greed, embezzlement, and deliberate deception 
of and moral harm to others were all criminal passions incited by coveting the other person’s property. 
Merchants dreamt of unbounded wealth; they attracted attention with their tactless and rowdy money-
dealing and trading activities. They were socially despised because their conspicuous wealth elicited 
criminal passions in the minds of others. Honest people were lured into a web of credit and debt in order 
to acquire luxury goods. At the same time, these law-abiding people were unaware of unethical and 
secretive trading customs hidden from the communal eye.27 
  
The Eighteenth Century and Its Sensationalist Trope: Adam Smith and the French Enlightenment 
 
Adam Smith did not simply applaud the advent of the economic rule of merchants, nor did he consider his 
own contemporaneous society as already governed by the principle of market access. His commercial 
society still exhibited many economic phenomena (guild masters, mercantilist monopolies, etc.) persisting 
from a pre-modern era. It was not a capitalist society but one in transition toward capitalism.28 Merchant 
capital succeeded in intervening in and rearranging the internal exchange chains. Wielding significant 
political power by means of their own trade corporations and the acquisition of offices, merchants became 
the leading sellers of basic materials to craftsmen and the buyers of many commodities in order to gain a 
monopoly in selling them.29  
No consensus existed among eighteenth-century intellectuals as to whether this transition had to be 
embraced. Even some radical liberal pamphleteers argued that the bonum commune (good society) 
represented by the corporations, although often identified as a feudal privilege, could serve the general 
interest.30 The ideal economic subject, apart from the question of who created the actual surplus product, 
was represented as the moral equivalent of the independent artisan who served the needs and wants of the 
people and possessed virtuous qualities of probity and modesty.31 Reformers also debated the impact of 
merchant capital on society and the sociability of the people. Merchants emulated the lifestyle of the nobles 
and tended to blur the different moral and customary representations of wealth — the ordinary objects of 
daily needs and the sensational qualities of luxurious goods. For many European intellectuals and 
administrators, the merchant’s chrematistic morality could corrupt whole nations.32 
                                                 
26 Conseil Supérieur de Pays du Grand Clermont 1633. Corpus du factums no. 459, Bibliothèque de la Cour d’Appel de 
Riom, 1770, 21. 
27 Charles de la Rue, Le magistrat Chrestien (Paris: Nicolas Padeloup, 1668 ([1647]), 168–173. 
28 Jelle Versieren, “The Moral Foundations of Adam Smith’s Transitional Society: Reappraising Foucault’s 
Representations of Wealth and Marx’s Reconstruction of Value Theory,” Capital & Class 40, no. 3 (2016). 
29 J.R. Kellett, “The Breakdown of Guild and Corporation Control over the Handicraft and Retail Trade in London,” 
The Economic History Review 10, no. 3 (1958). 
30 Helmut G Koenigsberger, “Schlussbetrachtung, Republiken und Republikanismus in Europa der frühen Neuzeit aus 
Historischer Sicht,” in Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Helmut G. Koenigsberger and 
Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1998), 285–302. 
31 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776, repr. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1977), 522. 
32 John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 128; Keith Michael Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), 118. 
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Smith’s view of the sensational trope of luxury stemmed from his overall theory of the sentiments, in 
which he declared that reason and virtues must be understood through the prism of passions socializing 
our behaviour.33 The everyday life-processes, analysed as moral conventions, undergirded the sociability 
of man, in which the expression of the gamut of natural passions was subject to constant social correction. 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), three classes of passions steered the moral existence of man: 
unsocial (e.g., hatred and resentment) , social (e.g., generosity and compassion), and selfish (e.g., grief and 
joy). In themselves, these passions could not be ethically judged. First, Smith required an adequate 
explanation of how man construes his world of moral conventions. Smith did not break up his theory of 
morals and passions into separate descriptive and normative components. He explained why certain 
morals are prevalent in society and provided with his own normative point of view. Second, he rendered 
the conventional world transparent by means of the simple concept of sympathy. Sympathy allowed one’s 
imagination to recreate the sentiments of one’s fellow human being in a particular situation. For Smith, 
sociability of man existed through the mirroring perspectives of each individual. Man, developing his 
natural dispositions into social conventions, were simultaneously a moral agent and a spectator. As one 
assessed the moral adequacy of other individuals, one too was aware that one became the subject of 
approbation, which Smith called mutual sympathy.  
Smith’s theory of the sentiments consisted of an image of man driven by the principles of sympathy 
and mirroring socialization. These two principles were natural prerequisites for appropriate and moderate 
behaviour. However, Smith also stated that there existed no necessary causality between these principles 
and appropriate behaviour in reality.34 Ultimately, a mental and a physical category of experience 
fundamentally determined all social behaviour: imagination and sensation. Imagination allowed man to 
make cognitive connections between random events and to anticipate hypothetical possibilities. The senses 
were the most direct means to interact with the exterior world. Imagination and the senses together allowed 
man to experience sentiments uncaused by any direct exterior impulse. The “sensational” in Smith’s theory 
pertained to anything which could arouse the senses in an ostentatious way. In the case of the sensational 
qualities of luxury, imagination allowed the senses to respond to the idea of having luxurious objects 
without actually possessing them. The sensational qualities of luxury simply appealed to imagination of 
man in that possessing them would improve one’s social status and winning the admiration of one’s peers.  
This is why Smith believed that man eventually should adhere to a set of virtues in order to make sense 
of his boundless imagination. A truly wise and virtuous person did not depend on the judgment of others.35 
This person should take into account a balance among four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, benevolence, 
and self-command. Smith’s virtues were in effect the reinvention of the old medieval virtues in secular 
terms: they had to counterbalance the worst unsocial passions aroused by a society bathing in luxury and 
money.36 Smith’s emphasis on the virtues of self-command and benevolence indicated his high regard for 
communal values. Self-command, a stoic virtue, counteracted a desire for excessive behaviour, and made 
man praiseworthy for his balanced and modest actions. Benevolent conduct revealed a profound interest 
in the well-being of fellow men.37 The morals of the pre-modern community reproduced these virtues as 
they wielded far more efficient social control over the moral habits of its members than did the direct use 
of force by an impartial sovereign or the compulsion of amoral exchange processes. Smith stated that 
market access in itself could produce a more conscientious man. Commutative justice merely ensured the 
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legal protection of the citizens, but the market had to be embedded in a moral economy that preserved the 
value of virtuous conduct.38 
For Smith, the sensationalist trope, driven by the passions, of acquiring of luxury goods and other 
representations of apparent wealth was morally ambiguous. In a commercial society, people often confused 
self-interest and self-betterment with possessions that mirror the social status of their superiors. In this case, 
prudence did not serve the final virtuous destination of a fulfilled life of tranquillity and modesty. Rather, 
as Smith admitted, this commercial society was driven by self-deception. People from all ranks and classes 
engaged in commercial exchanges in the hope of accruing an income that would allow them to display 
their success. Their acts of vanity and emulation garbled the ethical difference between seeking admiration 
from others and being praiseworthy for virtuous conduct. For them, merit equalled the enlargement of 
personal property, and luxury thereby deceived both reason and virtue. The sensational arousal of 
acquiring luxury goods, in the end, deceived people. At the same time, vanity, the root of many social 
conflicts, was a potent motive for individual economic advancement, thereby contributing to the general 
opulence of society. Taking away luxury would be detrimental for economic growth, although it could 
undermine the morals of a just society.39  
The moral effects of the progression of the commercial society brought about a fundamental confusion 
among people concerning the proper view of aesthetic qualities of both physical objects and social 
phenomena. Luxury, the result of personal success, gave people a false feeling of aesthetic satisfaction.40 
According to Smith, they evaluated their achievements according to how much their appearance and social 
status aroused others’ imagination, although luck and natural talent could not be ignored.41 Merchant 
capital impinging upon the social world broke down the relations between the ethical and the aesthetic. 
The sensational qualities of personal property became ends in themselves.  
Smith expatiated on the intimate relation between the ethical and the aesthetic. Further to his remark 
that exceptional aesthetic qualities of art could evoke strong feelings of metaphysical ecstasy and 
breathlessness, art also expressed a much more “profound” and “deeper” meaning about what it tried to 
imitate.42 The merchant selling luxury offered only superficial gratification. However, a virtuous person 
would find something ethical to be sensational because it elicited merit and admiration for its genuine 
moral existence, which stood at odds with the glamour of the commercial society. Society and people were 
not morally perfect. In most cases, they could not discern the difference between sensational luxury and 
the sensational aspects of a virtuous life. Smith contended that the deceptive sensationalist qualities of 
luxury objects could lead to a state of opulence. Hoping that higher ethical and aesthetic standards could 
be achieved without these objects is in itself a form of self-deception of the philosopher who confused 
“ought” with “is.”43 Smith’s use of the sensationalist trope indicated that a commercial society was in the 
making, but he repeatedly reverted to secularized pre-modern Christian and Stoic moral systems that could 
assuage fear of unhindered asocial passions. 
Smith was thoroughly familiar with the ideas of the French Enlightenment as a result of his stays in 
Paris and Geneva. In fact, both his economic and moral ideas arose from his studies of a vast array of French 
policy reformers, philosophers, and economists.44 Smith’s moral philosophical project elucidating the 
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sociability of man was in fact intended to formulate the prerequisites for judicial and institutional reform. 
Smith and his French colleagues debated whether mercantile capital and its capacity to disperse luxury 
goods could be included in the equation of stimulating the essence of man more virtuous through the 
melioration of their political institutions. The central question was how to morally appraise the existence 
of luxury.  
The topic of moral condemnation or approval of merchant capital and luxury lingered among 
intellectuals well into the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1764, the aristocratic reformer Jean-François 
de Saint-Lambert wrote his entry for Diderot’s Encyclopedia on the topic of luxury. He came close to literally 
repeating Smith’s theory of sentiments and virtues: 
 
Desire for luxury is and will be present in every man. It is the cause of our passions, 
our virtues, and our vices . . . luxury cannot be congruent with society’s concern 
for equality and the common good. Moralists took great effort to censure the 
abominations caused by luxury. . . . These moralists discussed luxury with more 
ill-tempered disapprovals than with a scientific mind. . . . Luxury became the 
subject of scientific inquiry for quite a while, especially in political literature. This 
literature does tend to give much more attention to the merchant class and its trade 
than it discusses the merits of philosophers or the interests of statesmen. . . . 
Philosophers state that luxury actually civilizes people and that it engenders the 
private virtues. . . . They equally say that luxury propels the power of nations and 
the happiness of citizens. . . . Moralists, on the other hand, unequivocally state that 
luxury comes hand in hand with great inequality, and thereby ruining the virtues 
of the rural population. Furthermore, it ruins sentiments of honor and 
patriotism. . . . Moderate philosophers emphasize that luxury is not leading a 
people into the abyss unless it circulates in excessive amounts. . . . Philosophers 
defending the interests of the merchants have failed to answer the question about 
the consequences of luxury. History has shown that it corrupts nations and 
empires . . . I believe that . . . luxury contributes to the wealth of our nation when 
it exists in moderation and does not impinge upon the delivery of products of the 
soil and the goods of manufactures of first and secondary importance. . . . In this 
case, it creates a multitude of workers making fashionable goods. . . . Luxury 
awakens the instinct of the passion that craves for luxury . . . but vicious luxury in 
excess destroys the moral sentiments of a nation . . . and the passion has to be 
subordinated under the communal spirit. . . . Luxury is excessive when men of 
humble decent became suddenly rich, and wealth is taking on a foul smell because 
they are only interested in power and pleasure. . . . This is certainly the case for 
wholesaling merchants whose income consists of exchanging goods that were 
made by craftsmen. . . . Their luxury introduced a new genre of wealth, a genre 
that is imitated by both the nobles and the commoners [translation by the author]45 
 
Saint-Lambert’s entry consisted of most of Smith’s themes found in both his Theory of Moral Sentiments and 
Wealth of Nations: the sensationalist trope pertaining to the mere superficial aesthetic qualities of luxury, 
passions, and instincts overriding rationality; the merchant class upsetting the social order; the moral 
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ambiguity of wealth and luxury; the merchants’ blatant denial of market access for the artisans; and the 
balance between life’s necessities and luxury.  
The conservative literary critic Jean-Marie-Bernard Clément, famous for his intellectual brawl with 
Voltaire about the merits and demerits of modern literature, wrote his first work with the title Satire sur les 
abus du luxe (1770) (A satire on the abuses of luxury). Imitating the literary corpus of ancient Roman satire 
(Catullus and Juvenal), he also repeated the contempt of Rome’s aristocratic class for the homo novus (new 
man). This heterogeneous social group entered the world of the aristocratic salons only by the demerit of 
being engaged in the lowest forms of hustle and bustle at the market places. As well, they combined the 
lack of morals in the dirty world of trade with a misplaced admiration for conspicuous consumption of 
their own luxury goods. Merchants were bereft of virtues that could discern the difference between the 
ethical substance of high art and the vulgar aesthetics of luxury: 
 
The riche nouveau (merchant, homo novus) succeeded into trading his goods within 
the circles of great men. . . . He considers only poverty as the only vice. . . . He is 
excited about everything that has been offered, and therefore will suffer from all 
its immoral consequences. The fervour of his gold-colored world unites with 
avarice. . . . Honour and virtue! Replaced by vanity. Superficial words invented 
for hiding his moral defects and unscrupulousness. . . . The obscure merchant, 
covered in blush, goes down the street. He is proud that he can be carried around 
in a dirty carriage. . . . How many of his peers were already impoverished by their 
conspicuous wealth? [translation by the author]46 
 
Clément likewise associated the vain and superficial aesthetic qualities of luxury and the passionate 
sensations it aroused to the social immodesty of the merchant class. Before the Revolution, Robespierre 
himself wrote on the moral question of luxury. He univocally condemned both the merchant class and the 
nobles as slaves to conspicuous consumption: 
 
This splendor . . . elicits the respect and admiration of the people. Splendor exerts 
imperial force on the people, they are compelled to imitate the mannerisms and 
repeat the ideas that purportedly would alleviate them from vulgarity. . . . Living 
large has become the general rule for the people . . . and becomes a merit in itself, 
and the merchants receive all the political consideration they want . . . luxury has 
become an exclusive morality. . . . The merchants only evince their vile virtues as 
they make the most ridiculous things fashionable, while they are abandoning the 
people. Merchants think that their turgid wealth can ennoble their existence . . . 
their luxury incites all possible passions. . . . Fashion that holds the people 
spellbound also promotes the idea of servitude and vanity. . . . while society 
should in fact ameliorate habits, ideas, and opinions. [translation by the author]47 
 
 Robespierre thus politicized the sensationalist trope. Enlightenment as a program of political reform 
should not regard luxury solely as an academic matter. The government should take measures to curb the 
circulation of luxury goods because luxury as the new morality was a means by which the merchant class 
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brings the artisans into servitude. Merchants did not dispossess the artisan’s condition of labour, but did 
control market access and thereby held sway over the people by corrupting their virtues.  
During the troubled times after Robespierre’s daring enterprise to ground the Republic in a set of new 
moral precepts, Louis-Sébastien Mercier wrote his influential book Le nouveau Paris (1799). His was a 
moderate voice of reform, well-known for critical commentary on the Philosophes huddled in the salons. 
For him, mercantile capital squandered valuable resources (riches of the soil and important manufacturing 
labour) in order to circulate exchange-value without use-value for its own direct benefit. Moreover, the 
sensation of luxury allowed the masses to indulge in irrational fantasies.48 According to Mercier, luxury 
was a handmaiden of the Revolution. The popular strata were driven by their asocial passion for obtaining 
the riches of the ruling classes, and the Revolution was actually an aestheticized spectacle, a sensational 
spectacle of destruction, scarifying the ethic substance of the nation — the wise and customary laws of the 
parliaments and municipalities, the symbolic power of the crown, the church’s authority, and the eternal 
justice governing the nation.49 Furthermore, Mercier denounced the role of mercantile capital as a force of 
progress. Merchants inculcated vanity and disregard for the virtuous life into the people’s minds. Mercier 
feared that justice and the state would descend into the abyss of corruption lest it hold back the free 
circulation of luxury and rentier activity: 
 
Morality has disappeared. . . . Merchants have taken over the nation with their 
public display of pleasure and the endless circulation of wares, credit, and bills of 
exchange . . . they hereby distribute empty flatteries and spectacles. . . . The old 
spirit of justice has now been called the cunning of mercantile exchange, and theft 
has been legally sanctioned. . . . The merchant’s society consists of money, mutual 
jealousy, orgies, and bacchanals. [translation by the author]50 
 
This condemnation of commerce, in turn, riled other reformers who sought to present their inquiries into 
the mechanisms of market exchange as the consummation of the scientific breakthrough of how to induce 
a nation to grow. For example, Pierre-Louis Roederer, a financial advisor of the Napoleonic regime, held 
moral philosophers such as Mercier to be short-sighted and predisposed toward the instrumental 
usefulness of mercantile capital for enhancing the opulence of all citizens. Merchants could perhaps not be 
entitled to stage themselves as the most noble among people, but “when extinguishing the enjoyment of 
luxury and one-sidedly idolizing the Arts, the productive classes will seize to supply the markets.”51 
Luxury objects, Roederer insisted, beckoned people to work in order to consume. Thus luxury, next to 
agriculture and basic consumer goods, can be morally permitted because it in effect contributes to the well-
being of the nation. However, Roederer also conceded that luxury did not convey an ethical substance — 
aesthetics as the appearance of truth and virtue — comparable to the arts.  
 
The Nineteenth Century, the Disappearance of Labour, and the Trope of Industrial Monotony: John 
Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall 
 
Alberto Gabriele has shown that during the industrialist age the sensationalist trope had fully migrated to 
the sphere of consumption. It became an apolitical trope expressing commodity fetishism, thereby giving 
currency to the idea that the world consisted of commodities supplied by the sensational inventions of the 
industrial class. This new industrial class appropriated the sensationalist trope in order to fabricate its 
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hegemonic economic ideas. The veneration of the first industrialists as singular geniuses, whose success 
was ideologically recoded in terms of individual creativity and broad prophetic vision, stemmed from later 
Victorian times. Starting in the 1840s and 1850s, both governmental bodies and industrial family dynasties 
sanctioned the invented tradition of portraying them as the symbolic embodiment of realized opportunities 
within a discourse of social mobility. Hagiographies were written and statues erected to commemorate the 
alleged hardship of acquiring their fortunes.52 The profit motive of industrial capital thus disguised itself 
as a righteous reward for those who were exceptional in turning the world into a compass of commodities.  
The practical bourgeoisie, the hitherto unsung heroes of the civilized world, became paradigmatically 
closely related to the concept of productivity. Mid-century bourgeois novels represented the first Industrial 
Revolution as a heroic battlefield on which industrialists, depicted as extraordinary individuals, fought for 
their noble cause against the collusion of the conservative interests of corrupt officials and doltish workers. 
Although industrialist production was dull when firmly established, the industrialist’s entrance on the 
historical stage had to be represented in pre-modern mythical terms.53 Thus, the new notion of industrial 
productivity united the industrialist as a new form of subjectivity and capital fetishism as an ideological 
thought-form of the physical form of fixed capital — machinery being the symbol of the endless capacity 
for making more commodities. Capital fetishism blotted out the social relationship between labour and the 
different capital-forms; fixed capital transformed labour into a passive instrument attached to machinery. 
The industrialist, although continuously preoccupied by the wage rate when developing the first cost 
accounting tools, presented machinery as an autonomous productive force melding the simple substances 
of labour and natural resources. Victorian industrialist dynasties bolstered their symbolic and social 
prestige by positing themselves as the sole productive segment of society; machinery was linked to the 
practical inventiveness of the industrialist. As such, capital fetishism discarded labour’s distinctive social 
and technical agency. 
Marshall and Mill both considered the ascent of the commercial society as beneficial to the lower strata 
of society. They assumed, reiterating Smith’s ideas, that the impartial functioning of the market allowed 
workers to optimally valorize their expended labour in material terms. The market empowered workers to 
free themselves from the political and moral tutelage of hierarchical superiors and to participate in society 
as civilized citizens.54 Ethical and economic advancement had to be two sides of the same coin. The exertion 
of labour could only be truly rewarding if it received its proper share of national wealth. The task of 
economic science, Marshall asserted, was explaining and clarifying the exact nature of market exchange, in 
which each person should be able to procure the basic necessities to satisfy their wants and needs. Market 
exchange, when market access had been established for all parties, functioned as an impartial arbiter and 
undergirded the ethical demand for a just remuneration of labour. Wealth, the sum of mostly material 
goods satisfying human wants, needed a price in monetary terms, because only the market allowed people 
to find the necessities confirming their status as both producers and consumers. In other words, market 
access guaranteed the existence of “personal wealth,” which also included non-marketable and immaterial 
aspects of life. Market exchange and the general conditions of social life, including the ethical component, 
could be seen as separate only for methodological reasons — more precisely, within a taxonomic division. 
At the same time, however, Marshall argued that a coherent ethical theory should substantiate a goal-
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oriented approach to market mechanisms. Markets as conceptual devices were amoral, but their concrete 
social existence demanded further moral elucidation.55 
Mill, whose economic theories set out the first steps of a distinctive scientific discourse that resonated 
with Victorian bourgeois morals, anticipated Marshall’s reformulation of the market-access thesis as the 
fetishistic means of concealing the exploitative relations of production. Mill witnessed the acceleration of 
investment in machinery and the exponential growth of commodity output. As an ideologue, he clearly 
defended the doctrine of industrialism, of which the bourgeoisie became the leading driver. This doctrine 
portrayed the British Isles as the globe’s workshop, enticing other nations to suffuse the burgeoning world 
market with their own commodities. At the same time, Mill conceded that the people of the growing 
working class had to spend their lives in economic and social destitution. Nonetheless, Mill apprised his 
educated readers that the laws of production could not be altered, even if they caused misery for the toiling 
masses. When money had been turned into productive capital, especially machinery, capital concentration 
was an inevitable intermediate result of the process of capital accumulation. The enactment of new laws, 
by which educated people inspired legislators with ideas of moderate reform, could influence the pace of 
technological innovation, which in turn could attenuate the detrimental social effects of this capital 
accumulation.56 Mill, casting Smith into a Victorian industrial mould, also hoped that educating the masses 
would develop their intellect, because ignorance, profligacy, and dishonesty inhibited any social 
advancement of the unkempt paupers. For this reason, Mill contributed to the ubiquitous debates on 
overpopulation as an important cause of poverty, and adhered to the Malthusian indictment of labourers 
begetting too many children and thereby violating a law of nature.57 
Mill asserted that a civilized nation, in promoting an industrialist agenda, should take into account the 
objective laws of production and nature. Commodity exchange laid bare the essential characteristics of 
societies in progression, and efficient production had to abide the compelling thrust of the market. Smith’s 
most important contribution to economics, according to Mill, was his emphasis on the deterministic nature 
of these laws over the long term. Social reform, contrary to Malthus’ self-justifying indifference to the social 
question, abated the effects of the enduring incongruity between these laws and the imprudent behaviour 
of the working classes. Human nature itself, Mill elaborated, was prone to certain rigid behaviours. The 
most apparent tendency, according to his utilitarian view, was to seek instant gratification by indulging in 
indolence and luxury, and therefore avoiding the drudgery of strenuous work. Furthermore, Mill’s 
investigations into the laws of production depended on an abstracted and idealized dichotomy within the 
economic agent: people always had to choose either committing to thrift and social advancement or 
succumbing to the seduction of short-sighted desires for exorbitant consumption and idleness. Luxury 
could be acquired only by hard work. The sensationalist qualities of luxury had no scientific or political 
meaning in themselves. Luxury did not itself promote indolence when the industrial system exerted 
sufficient economic force to transform individuals into capitalists and workers. As such, luxury was a 
commodity for those who were rewarded by the market.58 Mill acknowledged that these laws “were true 
only in the abstract,” but simultaneously concluded that “any placidity in human nature operated in the 
longer term.”59 If the industrial bourgeoisie chose the road of thrift, inheriting the mercantile wisdom of 
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saving in order to earn, the working class should follow its example. Policy reform should not rely on 
persuasion and assent. Rather, “work has to be enforced” and legislators must pursue “moral 
compulsion.”60 For most early liberal reformers, strict surveillance of the poor and inducing “efficient 
morality” were part and parcel of the attempt to “socialize” their apparently contumacious conduct.61 
Above all, Mill set his hopes on extending market access to materially and morally improve the 
labourer’s life. Meagre wages could cover most basic expenditures if the introduction of more machinery 
could match market capacity. Supplying the market with more commodities, Mill presumed, 
unintentionally benefited workers, because increased production renders very low wages socially 
sustainable. In Mill’s land of plenty, even the most modest workers could cut their coat according to their 
cloth. Mill considered the sensational qualities of luxury as insignificant and not to be appraised as a 
distinctive moral aspect of capitalism. For Marshall, fashion was merely a temporary and overestimated 
conception of changing techniques of production. The sensationalist trope ensconced in consumer culture 
vaguely indicated that production had yet to catch up with the real needs of the nation.62 At best, the 
industrialist could sell products at a temporarily higher gross margin when deploying the sensationalist 
trope in order to make people pay more for a commodity: 
 
That if straw hats come into fashion, or a new book gets sensational reviews & is 
the talk of the hour, increased supplies can be sold at a higher price is true . . . 
happening under the impulse of a change of fashion.63 
 
Mill did not univocally greet the industrial bourgeois habitus with praise. He also bemoaned the 
unwanted consequences, because “the character of the English is dull.” In modern capitalism, “the real 
problem is not so much to encourage thrift but rather to awake feelings for the nobler interests in 
humanity.”64 For Mill, production became the equivalent of monotony. Machines delivered the expected 
goods, and workers required few skills to master the mechanics of production. Industrial capitalism created 
a world of commodities and machinery, and only the inventiveness of the bourgeois class still seemed to 
appeal to the imagination.65 The ennui of work came with certain disadvantages. Marshall reiterated Mill’s 
theory of capitalism without sensational qualities. The repetitive pulse of industrial capital not only 
dismantled the social coding of a medieval “metaphysical content” of the use-value of a commodity, but 
its predicted output was quantifiable in both monetary and material terms. Workers were discontented not 
because they had to endure the monotony of production, but rather, Marshall underlined, because they 
still believed in the sensationalist trope of consumer society. They were psychologically incapable of 
realizing that they could not purchase the luxury that they imagined they deserved.66 
This trope of capital fetishism, monotony, echoed the well-known ideologue of Victorian vulgar 
Whiggism Andrew Ure who stated in his controversial work The Philosophy of Manufactures (1835) that the 
routine of industrial processes inevitably took away human agency as the great administrator of 
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production. Until the advent of the modern machine, artisans could autonomously choose how to work. 
According to Ure, the working class was a new genus totally different from craftsmen, devoid of self-will 
and contumaciousness.67 Machinery had produced a new kind of person under its repetitive compulsion. 
Marshall attempted to depict the industrial process within a continuum of economic behaviour. He 
presumed that the raison d’être of economic activity was procuring food and a few “conventional 
necessaries.” According to Marshall, luxury was something the working class simply did not need. Only 
individuals with considerable disposable income were allowed to maintain a higher standard of living. The 
comparison of needs and wants of particular citizens was reflected in the wage basket of each citizen: 
 
For the sake of giving definiteness to the ideas it may be well to venture on 
estimates of necessaries . . . the strict necessaries for an average agricultural family 
are covered by fifteen or eighteen shillings a week. . . . For the family of the skilled 
workman living in a town we may take twenty-five or thirty shillings for strict 
necessaries. . . . For a man whose brain has to undergo great continuous strain the 
strict necessaries are perhaps two hundred or two hundred and fifty pounds a year 
if he is a bachelor: but more than twice as much if he has an expensive family to 
educate. His conventional necessaries depend on the nature of his calling.68 
 
Marshall portrayed a society in which market access reflects Mill’s laws of production and nature. The 
market was a crude and approximate transposition of these laws, and through the manifold activities of 
exchange, it ensured the fair distribution of commodities. Nonetheless, the monetary value of the 
remuneration could be neither predicted nor calculated with precision. Customs and cultural habits also 
determined the distribution of the surplus product. However, since in his late-Victorian mindset neither 
class analysis nor ideological components determined the reproduction of social relations, Marshall 
reverted to these laws to vindicate income inequalities. Production gave the income that labourers 
deserved. Moreover, the mechanic compulsion of the machinery allowed the capitalist class to better 
calculate the “the correct wage” to pay workers according to the worth of their efforts. The cause of any 
perceived discrepancy between earnings and acquired commodities was that the workers clearly did not 
understand that they simply were paid the monetary value of what they contributed to the production 
processes.69  
Ultimately, Marshall related these laws to a personal evaluation of labour activities and to the vagaries 
of a naturalist explanation of a social hierarchy of physical needs. In his romantic worldview, a farmer was 
completely at peace with his life governed by the paucity of resources, while a fixed natural disposition — 
exemplified by the locution “the nature of his calling” — sanctioned the market provision of goods to each 
individual. Thus Marshall straddled two apparent contradictory visions: market access to the commodity 
liberated the subaltern classes from extra-economical domination, while the social and symbolic status of 
work should still reflect the use-value of the commodity.  
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This paper started by emphasizing the importance of Marx’s concepts of commodity and capital fetishism 
in discerning the uniqueness of the capitalist mode of production. Fetishism is an ideological construct in 
which nineteenth-century economists reflected on the nature of work and industrial production. The 
nineteenth century was characterized by a fetishized consumer culture through the discursive deployment 
of the sensationalist trope. However, medieval and early modern philosophers had already recognized the 
sensationalist trope in regard to the merchant class distributing luxury goods.  
The pre-capitalist trope of sensationalism did not utter the same discursivity of fetishism as that of the 
nineteenth-century fetishized commodity culture. This trope pertained to the moral and political 
implications of a pre-modern merchant class conveying luxury goods to their consumers in various social 
and institutional orders. Without a dominant capitalist mode of production, theorizing about markets and 
commodities remained focused on merchants’ economic function of selling luxury goods in overall moral 
terms. Nonetheless, some philosophers such as Adam Smith and Jean-François de Saint-Lambert 
emphasized that productive self-betterment also thrived upon a desire for sensational embellishments and 
ostentatious possessions. At the same time, their contemporaries such as Maximilien de Robespierre and 
Louis-Sébastien Mercier were disconcerted about the moral effects of the relentless pursuit of luxury goods 
and the instrumentalization of aesthetic life.  
The nineteenth century reinvented the sensationalist trope, however, transposing the pre-modern 
moral and political features onto the distinct sphere of consumer culture. The emergence of a fetishistic 
consumer culture was driven by the sensationalist qualities of the commodities and thereby reaffirmed the 
ideology of commodity fetishism. These discursive differences confirm Marx’s theory of fetishism as a 
phenomenon intimately tied to the industrial capitalist mode of production. In contrast to popular 
consumer fetishism, nineteenth-century economists such as John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall asserted 
that the entrepreneurial spirit was characterized by eschewing luxury goods. In particular, they translated 
the ideological language of fetishism in a discourse that can be conceptualized as the trope of monotony of 
production. They emphasized that a continuous investment in machinery was necessary for capital 
accumulation. Capitalism in general, they asserted, was characterized by the predictability of the rhythm 
of machines. All productivity gains were explained by the machines’ boundless possibilities. This new kind 
of fetishism in effect erased the social power of labour.  
The sensationalist trope did appear in the writings of these nineteenth-century economists, but they 
considered it as a psychological phenomenon arising from workers’ character deficiencies. Workers were 
enthralled by a sensationalist consumer culture, which caused them, according to the economists, great 
mental agony resulting in general social unrest. 
Last, the simultaneous reinvention of the sensationalist trope and the appearance of the monotony 
trope require that the nineteenth century be analysed as a multi-temporal timeframe. Fetishism required 
both discursivities of the past and novel narrations in order to establish itself as the superstructure of the 
industrial capitalist mode of production. This explains why the nineteenth-century economists still referred 
to the older market-access concept to justify the social inequality that their laws of production created. 
 
